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Regimental reconnaissance reported that the lead task
force (which was delayed by the munitions)
had committed south to reinforce
their advance guard team.
Summary
Decision point tactics are essential to fighting the fluid battlefield conditions present during the meeting battle. There
are four imperatives to the successful execution of decision point tactics during the meeting battle:
Imperative 1: A unit must have good battlefield vision to clearly identify the conditions necessary to execute a
specific decision. The simplicity of the meeting battle maneuver plan, coupled with a solid wargame and
Seeing the commitment of the main body, the
brigade committed its reserve in an attempt to block the
OPFOR attack north of the Racetrack. Main body forces
destroyed the brigade reserve and continued
to envelop and destroy the lead task force.
rehearsal process, commander in battlefield vision.
Imperative 2: Successful reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance efforts by both regimental
reconnaissance and CRPs are essential to identifying the decision point conditions and denying the same to
the enemy.
Imperative 3: The OPFORs highly trained crews and platoons are the foundation for the execution of
decision point tactics.
Imperative 4: Deception operations in support of the meeting battle, although not as resource intensive as
other operations, are essential to gaining the time necessary to get inside the enemy commander's decision
cycle.
Decision point tactics are neither unique nor new, but they form the foundation for the successful execution during
the meeting battle. See you on the battlefield.
Endnote:
1. The NTC OPFOR receives its initial warning order 45 days prior to execution. The warning order
comes in the form of combat battle instructions (CBI). The CBI outlines OPFOR missions, forces
available and the area of operations for every mission. This allows the OPFOR to execute the DDMP
for each mission.
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Counter-optical laser simulation is currently omitted from the realistic training provided to combined arms and
services brigades and regiments rotated through the National Training Center (NTC).1 Such simulation had been
discussed by the command staff in the past but was deemed unfeasible because of technical and integration
problems.2
While use of the class of these lasers "specifically designed to cause permanent blindness of unenhanced vision" has
been deemed criminal by the Department of Defense, the growing significance of counter-optical lasers to future
warfighting scenarios makes renewed discussion warranted.3 Given the OPFOR or "New Krasnovian" predilection
toward the use of persistent chemicals on Bluefor lead elements and as a means of area denial, a perception of their
future use of counter-optical lasers is not unrealistic.
The Krasnovians are not inhibited by Western ethical constraints. Therefore, in pursuit of an operational edge, they
can be expected to employ advanced weaponry which they obtain, such as counter-optical lasers, without moral
reservation. If our soldiers are expected to face the rigors that the future battlefield holds, then simulating the use of
these lasers by an opposing force would appear prudent.
Counter-Optical Lasers
The threat counter-optical lasers pose has been discussed
The Krasnovians are not inhibited
by Western ethical constraints.
for well over a decade. A Military Review article written by LTC Douglas P. Bacon in 1980 recognized that the
laser technology employed in range finders and target designators would undoubtedly be exploited for other
purposes.4 This was further made clear by David Morrison in two mid-1980s articles concerning the use of lasers
against electro-optical and bio-optical systems: that is, electronic and human eyes.5 The subsequent use of lasers by
the Soviet navy in the late 1980s against the crews of US reconnaissance aircraft, such as the P-3C, served to
validate these early warnings.6
Against electro-optical systems, lasers are able to produce what is know as "crazing" (see side bar below). Such an
effect is catastrophic because it denies an opposing tank or fighting vehicle crew much of its ability to identify and
acquire opposing forces. Because of this threat, new optical sights are being built with laser protection in mind,
although in some cases, as a defense against only a single wavelength. While older systems can be retrofitted with
laser protection, it is expensive, amounting to $30,000 per tank in the M1 upgrade program.7
Against bio-optical systems, lasers have an even more pronounced effect than crazing. While the optics on a tank
can be replaced, if the retina within the human eye is severely damaged, vision loss is permanent. Vision loss may
result from three main damage processes: ionization, thermal and photochemical. Ionization refers to the formation
of plasma bubbles within the eye which causes shock waves resulting in tissue damage. Thermal damage refers to
the overheating of the eye which breaks down its structure and functioning. Photochemical damage, the least likely
to take place because of the long exposure time required, alters the eyes chemical properties.8
The effects of lasers on the human eye are increased when magnifying optics are used. As a result, tank
commanders and gunners are particularly vulnerable. A tank having had both its optics crazed and crewmen blinded
would thus be a natural outcome stemming from a counter-optical laser directed against it.
Speculation on the battlefield advantages that counter-optical
Crazing
Higher-powered low energy laser weapons have the capability of heating and distorting or cracking
the glass lenses of optical systems. This effect is called crazing and is caused when the heat buildup
and subsequent cooling in the glass surface creates uneven stresses in the glass surface to crack it.
The result is a frosted effect, making it impossible to see through the glass lenses or vision blocks
(glass windows) in tanks. Such targets may be affected at long ranges, and the optics can be crazed in
less time than is needed to blink an eye.
Laser Weapons: The Dawn of a New Military Age, p. 148.
lasers could provide the New Krasnovians is not difficult. These systems, mounted on BMPs and BRDMs, could
be used to "lase" opposing Bluefor scout forces to deny them battlefield intelligence. The ranges of some of these
lasers may give them the potential of providing a stand-off OPFOR weapon superior in range to conventional
BLUFOR combat systems.9 Further, Bluefor would be required to contend with large numbers of "blinded" soldiers
who would require medical attention and evacuation, placing further logistical strain on its combat effectiveness.
As we enter the 21st century, the availability of these lasers becomes less and less of a question. The former Soviet
Union "..reduced the size of their systems to a point where ground forces can be equipped with lasers for both
offense and defense."10 With the breakup of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new commercial systems which
have proven to be more advanced than military based systems in a wide range of critical technologies, we may
expect a future proliferation of counter-optical systems in the worlds armies."
Simulating Counter-Optical Lasers
Because the simulated OPFOR employment of counter-optical lasers has in the past been deemed problematic
from a technical and integrational perspective, their inclusion only on a "limited basis" is advocated. This approach is
further warranted because the threat that these lasers represent is still an emerging one, and the Army currently
exists in a time of severe budgetary constraint.
The process behind the limited inclusion of these systems, nevertheless, would require an update to NTC
Instrumentation System (NTC-IS) computer symbology.12 A new kill code
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symbol termed "Sensor" would be required. It would represent an AFV or tank which has had its optics crazed.
Such a vehicle would be unable to fire its main armament, spot for artillery fires or close air support (CAS), or
communicate the movements of opposing forces. In essence, a sensor kill would designate a blinded vehicle.13
Crew members affected by such an attack could wear partial blindfolds or an eye patch to simulate the loss of
vision.14 While this could be initially damaging to the morale of our soldiers as many troops may rather be killed
than blinded, it would help to desensitize them to the types of blinding weapons that Army forces may be facing in
the future, "Lasing" directed against dismounted infantry squads could also be explored.15
Rather than being incorporated into the MILES II system so that such counter-optical laser simulation would result
from direct firing events, it could be more cost-effectively modeled by being designated an administrative function.
While not as realistic as an OPFOR BMP directly lasing a BLUFOR M2/M3, this approach could form the basis
of future direct fire implementation if counter-optical laser proliferation someday makes this a critical necessity.
For implementation purposes, an OPFOR scout company could be given a number of lasing missions to simulate
the counter-optical systems mounted on its BMPs and BRDMs. The initial capacity to call in such a mission would
be determined by range and line-of-sight constraints. Other parameters such as weather conditions, smoke, and
countermeasures could then be factored into the successfulness of each lasing attempt. If a sensor kill is warranted,
it would then be done administratively.
Such an implementation strategy is not meant to be definitive. Rather, as an illustrative example, it may help to serve
as a catalyst concerning how counter-optical lasers could be cost-effectively simulated at NTC.
Conclusion
While many may find non-Western concepts of non-lethality abhorrent to our moral tenets, the danger of these
concepts being applied to the advanced technologies which are developing cannot be ignored.16 A Bluefor soldier
blinded on the battlefield requires far more of our resources than one that has been killed. The frontal armor of an
M1 Abrams may be impervious to the conventional armament of a BMP, but its optics may not survive one
retrofitted with a state-of-the-art counter-optical system.
Ultimately, counter-optical lasers represent technically advanced directed energy-weapons. The future warfighting
potential that they represent is far in advance of our traditional chemical/combustion based weaponry. Their
battlefield use for purposeful blinding has been deemed unethical by a democratic West: however, their future
employment in this manner by non-western forces may not be so constrained. If the New Krasnovians are to
accurately model the threat that such forces pose to our Army, their simulated use of counter-optical lasers must be
reexamined.
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Introduction
Until 1994, Commonwealth of Independent States arms manufacturers were only producing antitank guided missile
(ATGM) systems that were wireguided, with limited range and subject to countermeasures. These included the
Fagot (AT-4/SPIGOT), Konkurs (AT-5/SPANDREL), and Metis (AT-7/SAXHORN).
